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Abstract
The article starts out from the observation that software engineering splits in two large activity
areas: Software speciﬁcation with its veriﬁcation and software implementation with its veriﬁcation.
To ﬁnd answers to the question in the title the article studies a practical systems software engineer-
ing area where theory is better developed than compared to other areas: Compiler construction.
Our answer is a conclusion from work in the DFG-project Veriﬁx, U.Karlsruhe, U.Kiel, U.Ulm,
1995-2003. One very complex cooperational task has been construction of a so called initial correct
compiler for a realistic high level programming (and compiler writing) language correctly imple-
mented and executed on a real life host processor. The interface between compiling speciﬁcation
and compiler implementation is given by algebraic-style, conditional formula transformation or
program term rewriting rules which the speciﬁer ﬁgures out and must prove correct w. r. t. source
program and target processor semantics and data and states representations.
Intensive cooperation of compiling speciﬁers and compiler implementers has revealed that the
implementer’s mathematical reasoning is algebraic reasoning of moderate depth. The speciﬁer
overtakes semantical issues and does induction proofs, a ﬁeld of much more intricate mathematical
reasoning.
Keywords: Compiler, speciﬁcation, implementation, correctness, code inspection, term-rewriting,
algebraic reasoning
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1 Motivation of the question
In 1968 at the Garmisch NATO-conference, F. L. Bauer created the notion
of software engineering. Since the 1970s, schools like VDM [45] , CIP (an
algebraic school) [2,64], Z [70] or ASM [4] split software engineering in two
large areas: Software speciﬁcation and software implementation. Mathemati-
cal reasoning about software is so called software veriﬁcation and splits in two
disciplines: Software speciﬁcation veriﬁcation and software implementation
veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst discipline means for transformational software: Math-
ematical proof of correctness of a specifying mapping from abstract input to
abstract output data w.r.t. characterizing problem oriented properties. The
second discipline means: Correctness proof of a translation of the specifying
mapping to an implementing program of a correctly executable programming
language. In case veriﬁcation is done in one step the specifying mapping can
be seen as given by the semantics of the implementing program. Questions:
Do software speciﬁcation and implementation veriﬁcation require diﬀerent lev-
els, kinds and abilities of mathematical reasoning? Are there diﬀerent levels
of mathematical intricacy? What special kind of mathematics does software
implementation veriﬁcation require?
Because the area of software engineering is wide it seems to be wise ﬁrstly
to restrict to software which is closer known to informaticians and software
engineers: Systems software. So we shield application software the essential
properties of which are deﬁned not only by computer scientists but, above all,
by application engineers and scientists. Second restriction: Among systems
software there is one area which up to now has a theory better developed than
other systems software areas have: Compiler construction. So in this lecture
we investigate compiling speciﬁcation veriﬁcation (shorter: compiling veriﬁ-
cation) versus compiler implementation veriﬁcation as has been taken over
from the EU-funded project “Provably Correct Systems - ProCoS”, directed
by D.Bjørner and C.A.R.Hoare, 1989/95 [3,50] and done in more extension in
the DFG-funded project ”Veriﬁcation of Compiler Speciﬁcations, Implementa-
tions and Generation Techniques (Verifying Compilers) – Veriﬁx“, directed by
G.Goos, F.W. von Henke and H.Langmaack, 1995/2003 [19,49,20,26,35,12,21].
The authors of [10] were probably the ﬁrst who came up with diﬀerentiating
between these two compiler veriﬁcation areas.
Compiler constructors are allowed to work under two relieving assumptions
[34] :
(i) Source level application programs are assumed to be correct w.r.t. their
characterizing properties. Application programmers are responsible here,
compiler constructors need only consider bare semantics of well-formed
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source programs and not any further intentions of the application side
(unless the source programs are systems programs used in compiler con-
struction).
(ii) Hardware, i.e. target and host processors, are assumed to work correctly
as described in their instruction manuals. Hardware engineers are re-
sponsible here, compiler constructors need only consider bare semantics
of processor languages irrespectively of any errors in hardware construc-
tion. Further justiﬁcations of this assumption are: Hardware engineers
have a much more rigorous culture in failures treatment than software en-
gineers and hardware shows better resistancy against malevolent attacks
[53].
Due to the hardware correctness assumption above (2.) every well-formed
binary coded processor program is correctly executable. A higher level lan-
guage program is correctly executable if there is a corresponding compiler
(or interpreter) program correctly implemented as a well-formed binary coded
processor program.
In spite of these two relieving assumptions there are virtually no executable
industrial-commercial compilers available for which both, speciﬁcations and
implementations, have been rigorously veriﬁed in full extension. See long lists
of compiler bugs [21,5,44].
We have to accept that up to now rigorous compiler veriﬁcations have been
performed mainly in academic institutions or in companies close to academic
circles and not subjected to hard industrial competition. So we ought to ﬁnd
out what qualiﬁcations industrial software engineers and compiler constructors
must possess who are able to do veriﬁcation as well.
Compiler construction plus rigorous veriﬁcation demand both a good sys-
tems software engineering qualiﬁcation and a proper mastership in theoretical
informatics and program semantics which in some sense are special areas of
mathematics. It is by no means contradictory that an industrial software en-
gineering area requires a great deal of theoretical considerations. Every good
industrial practice is based upon theory, mathematical theory in our situation.
L. Boltzmann pronounced that no idea is more practical than a good theory.
A. Einstein even stated that only theory can say what is an appropriate ex-
periment.
What can we learn from compiler construction and veriﬁcation activities in
order to explore which kinds and styles of mathematics are relevant? Firstly,
we try to ﬁnd out problems by diﬀerentiating between speciﬁcation and im-
plementation of compilers. Later for more decisive answers, we look at details
in compiler veriﬁcation projects [66,57,58,34,15,52]. A preliminary version of
the present article appeared as [51].
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2 Problems in adequate notions of correct implemen-
tation of program semantics and of programs
When we see the phrase “compiler veriﬁcation“ in literature then most au-
thors only mean “compiling speciﬁcation veriﬁcation“. Furtheron, results on
compiling speciﬁcation veriﬁcation must be handled with care, their assump-
tions are often unrealistic so that there are serious diﬃculties to subject the
results to industrial requirements:
The diﬃculties stem e.g. from problematic choices of too idealistic target
processors with inﬁnite memories of cells where each one is capable to store any
source language datum [66]. In theoretical informatics there is an unfortunate
tendency to hide the roˆle of representations and abstractions (retrievings)
between abstract and concrete data and programs. For software engineers in
industry (and academic informaticians as well) it is often quite hazardous to
incorporate missing representations and abstractions in results on speciﬁcation
veriﬁcations.
The diﬃculties originate also from questionable choices of notions of cor-
rect implementation of a source program (semantics) by a target program
(semantics). Namely diﬀerent application areas and programmers have dif-
ferent view points and interests: A programmer of safety critical processes
expects preservation of total program correctness as his notion of correct im-
plementation [8,38,56]. This means in equivalent words: If a source program
terminates successfully then so does the target program with equal resp. cor-
responding source and target results. The majority of programmers in “usual”
information processing neither look so much for guaranteed successful program
termination nor for total program correctness. “Usual” programmers are very
satisﬁed with partial program correctness and its preservation [6,47]. This type
of preservation can be formulated equivalently: If a target program terminates
successfully then so does the source program with equal resp. corresponding
source and target results.
A compiler constructor favours to consider himself as a “usual“ program-
mer. Let his compiler, written in a speciﬁcation or high level host language, be
implemented on a host processor. Since this processor and also the target pro-
cessor have only ﬁnite resources it is unreasonable to demand or expect that
every well-formed source program can be successfully translated and every
generated target program can be correctly implemented on the target proces-
sor. Nevertheless, compiler constructors must take in consideration further
and diﬀerent notions of implementation correctness which depend on the ap-
plication ﬁelds of the source languages which are to be compiled to code of
real life target processors.
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Optimizing compilers (better: target code improving compilers) deserve a
decent deliberation concerning errors in source and target code. Total pro-
gram correctness does not guarantee any pleasant program property in case of
at least one non-successfull computation starting with inputs in the associated
precondition domain. All errors as there are operation errors like division by
zero, other execution undeﬁndnesses, array bounds violations, inﬁnite com-
putations by loops or recursive procedures, number or memory overﬂows and
other target processor error reports are considered to be unacceptable, chaotic,
inexcusable, to be avoided by program users.
On the other hand, in case of partial program correctness, all errors are
considered acceptable, excusable, unavoidable. In case of an error a program
user simply tries a diﬀerent computation, perhaps with a diﬀerent input, and
hopes for success. But the situation changes as soon as we optimize a compiler
which preserves partial correctness. Errors come into play which a user must
avoid by input data restrictions. A most prominent optimization in practice is
elimination of array bounds tests in generated target code, a special dead code
elimination. The new compiler does no longer preserve partial program cor-
rectness. Target code computations may terminate successfully whereas there
is no corresponding source program computation which ends successfully with
the same resp. a corresponding result. So the target processor’s computed
result has nothing in common with the source program’s semantics.
If we want to avoid to be cheated by the optimizing compiler then we must
declare array bounds violation in the source program semantics as an unac-
ceptable error which the user must avoid by appropriate restriction to so called
admissible inputs. So we have a generalized kind of program correctness, so
called relative program correctness, and of implementation correctness in the
sense of preservation of relative program correctness [59,60,76]. User manuals
of optimizing compilers, especially commercial ones, must warn the user very
clearly that he has to restrict his inputs to admissible ones. [62] harshly criti-
cizes the actual state of the art in real life compiler manuals. An implemented
executable optimizing compiler in general does not and cannot say which in-
puts may cause computations with unacceptable errors. The user himself has
to avoid them. In future verifying compilers in the sense of C.A.R.Hoare [40]
might be able to warn or even prevent the user to start translated programs
with inadmissible inputs.
Let us formalize the ideas. The notion of correct implementation  deals
with program semantics fs, ft, data representations ρi, ρo and data (state) do-
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where ⇀ or  indicate partially deﬁned multivalued functions (relations). Due
to [59,60,76] data domains D include disjoint error sets
D = Dreg ∪ A ∪ U = Dreg ∪ Ω = Dacc ∪ U .
We have regular data Dreg , acceptable errors A , unacceptable errors U and
acceptable data Dacc. Semantics and representations are required to be strongly
error strict, i.e. total on Ω , error strict and, beyond that, unacceptable error
strict.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Correct implementation in the sense of commutativity or
simulation) ft correctly implements fs (fs  ft for short) iﬀ for all admissible
inputs d ∈ Daccsi
ft(ρi(d) ∩D
acct
i) ⊆ ρo(fs(d)) ∩D
acct
o
where admissibility of d means fs(d) ⊆ D
accs
o .
Nothing is said about inadmissible d and how ft deals with inadmissible
target input data. The user is warned furtheron to apply ft to target input
data outside ρi-represented admissible inputs.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Relative program semantics correctness) f is relatively cor-
rect w.r.t. pre- and postcondition Φ ⊆ Di,Ψ ⊆ Do(< Φ > f < Ψ > for short)
iﬀ
f(Φ ∩Dacci ) ⊆ Ψ ∩D
acc
o .
If all errors, especially divergence or inﬁnite, non-terminating computation,
are acceptable (or a little more general: if resulting unacceptable errors come
only from unacceptable input errors) then we have partial program semantics
correctness. If all errors and undeﬁnednesses are considered to be unacceptable
errors (or again a little more general: if resulting acceptable errors come only
from acceptable input errors and all latter ones result in acceptable errors)
then we have total correctness.
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Theorem 2.3 (Correct implementation in the sense of preservation of rela-
tive program semantics correctness) ft correctly implements fs iﬀ
< Φ > fs < Ψ > implies < ρi(Φ) > ft < ρo(Ψ) >
for all Φ ⊆ Dsi ,Ψ ⊆ D
t
o .
It is obvious what correct implementation in the sense of preservation of
partial resp. total program semantics correctness is. The following theorem is
important for compilation in passes:
Theorem 2.4 Correct implementation is transitive horizontally and verti-
cally, i.e. commutative diagrams can be composed in both directions.
Transfering the notions of relative correctness and correct implementa-
tion from program semantics f to well-formed programs π of a programming
language L is simple: π is called relatively correct iﬀ its uniquely associated
semantics [[π]]L ∈ SemL is so. And πt correctly implements πs iﬀ [[πt]]TL does
so for [[πs]]SL , i.e. [[πs]]SL  [[πt]]TL . The semantics space SemL is deﬁned by
{f : Di ⇀ Do}
where Di and Do are the input and output data domains associated to L.
Semantics spaces like SemSL, SemTL may be considered as second order data
domains, and an implementation relation SemSL  SemTL (parameterized by
ρi and ρo ) as a corresponding program semantics.
Total program correctness implies partial one and often is much harder
to prove. On the other side: Implementation correctnesses in the sense of
preservation of total resp. partial program correctness are logically indepen-
dent. Nevertheless, it is in a way intuitive that a proof of partial correctness
preservation is harder than a proof of total correctness preservation. Are there
mathematical justiﬁcations of this interesting observation? We ﬁnd answers
in [55,59,60,76]: The authors assume source languages to be furnished with
denotational predicate transformer semantics, target languages with opera-
tional step semantics. The decisive diﬀerence is evoked by the premis whether
divergence is considered to be an unacceptable error (total program semantics
correctness) resp. to be an acceptable one (partial program semantics cor-
rectness). The inductive proof of total correctness preservation utilizes just
a series of algebraic laws for assembly instructions semantics. But proof of
preservation of partial correctness has, above that, to exploit a ﬁxpoint char-
acterization of the operational target semantics. The authors of [15] with their
mechanical PVS-based proofs have the following answer to the question above:
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For a proof of total correctness preservation rule induction suﬃces whereas
partial correctness preservation requires a more intricate measure induction.
We should keep in mind that there is a twofold genesis of unacceptable
errors and their associated inadmissible inputs of a well-formed source program
which is correctly implemented and executed by a target program. In case of
an inadmissible input there is either a target program computation which
contradicts the source program semantics as expressed in Def. 2.1; or the
source program semantics applied to the input does not satisfy the user’s
intentions. So the reasons for unacceptable errors are weaknesses 1. of the
implementation technique or 2. of the source program w. r. t. its application.
Admissible inputs d of fs split also in two characteristic subdomains. The
ﬁrst one is that domain of d-s with
ft(ρi(d) ∩D
regt
i) ⊆ ρo(fs(d)) ∩D
regt
o
where all target computations of regular inputs lead to regular results. For the
other admissible inputs representation ρo, which is allowed to be multivalued,
makes use of the programmer’s generosity that he is ready to accept so called
acceptable target errors beside to accept regular results.
3 Demands of oﬃcial software certiﬁcation boards how
to generate highest quality programs and software
In 1989/94 the German Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI published oﬃcial IT-certiﬁcation prescriptions for IT-safety and -security
[77,78,9] 2 . BSI introduced eight quality levels of trustworthiness from Q0
(a given program is unsuﬃciently checked) up to Q7 (a high level language
version of a program is formally veriﬁed w.r.t. characterizing properties, the
proof and the program’s implementation on a processor are performed by
oﬃcially admitted tools). Oﬃcially admitted means: An oﬃcial validation
test suite is passed successfully. Because BSI felt that this kind of admission
does not meet proved correctness [13] BSI added the following more rigorous
code checking requirement for compiler tools:
“The transformations from source to target code exe-
cuted by the admitted compiler program must be a-
posteriori checkable (inspectable, in German: nachvol-
lziehbar)” [17].
2 There are similar activities in other countries.
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It is amazing that a higher quality level Q8 (a program and its implementa-
tion on a processor are proved correct; i.o.w. a program is formally veriﬁed as
for Q7, the proof and the program’s implementation are performed by proved
correct and correctly implemented tools) is outside the scope of thinking of
an IT-certiﬁcation board although renowned computer scientists have stressed
the eminent importance of program correctness (including prover and compiler
tool correctness) since a long time [73,18,61,39,13].
Nevertheless, it is BSI’s IT-certiﬁcation prescription for BSI’s highest qual-
ity level Q7 which has suggested to our ProCoS- and Veriﬁx-projects [50],
[19,49] the employment of checking or inspecting (by program or by hand) of
generated programs or codes in methods how to develop correct realistic com-
pilers, correctly implemented even down in binary real world host processor
code. Although BSI does not think of proved correct and correctly imple-
mented (only oﬃcially admitted) compilers one of our investigation results is
that
BSI’s prescription and recipe Q7 is applicable also to
compilers (which so is becoming a bootstrapping tech-
nique [75]) and suﬃces to create realistic Q8-compilers
.
The reason why BSI did not venture to demand a more rigorous tool ad-
mittance becomes aware when recipe Q7 is applied to veriﬁcation (upper com-
mutativity) of a SL to TL-compiler τ1 written in a high level host language
HL and to inspection (lower commutativity) of compiler τ2 implemented as
an executable binary host machine program (code) HML:
SemSL  SemTL program semantics
[[]]SL ↑ ↑ [[]]TL






⇀ TL′ concrete well − formed programs








⇀ TL′′ concrete well − formed programs
and other HML− data
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The ϕ-s are program representations and, in the lower diagram, identical to
the representations ρ of input and output data of programming languages like
HL and HML.
If BSI had required that the HL to HML-bootstrapping compiler tool τ0
is not just tested but proved correct and correctly executable then, on the one
hand, inspection of τ2 is unnecessary, but on the other hand, a further compiler
(namely τ0) with the same high qualities is required as we are intending to
prove them for the so called initial τ2. By BSI’s intellectual withdrawal to Q7
BSI avoids the logical diﬃculties of this circular regression.
But BSI’s recipe to create executable so called highest quality Q7-programs
demands to do code checking for every translated program again and again. As
that is nasty and time consuming [65] one might think to develop programs to
perform the code checkings, but there is always remaining a certain quantum
of code checking which must be done manually [68,49].
In the eyes of informatics science certiﬁcation boards are obliged to intro-
duce the higher software quality level Q8 because existence of Q8-compilers
makes (low level) code checking unnecessary (outside compiler building) and
because the Veriﬁx-project has demonstrated that realistic proved correct and
correctly implemented initial compilers can be constructed which translate
high level systems programming (compiler writing) languages on real world
processors [34,41].
4 Formalized diﬀerentiation between compiling speciﬁ-
cation and compiler implementation
BSI’s recipe Q7 is not easy to apply. This is because code inspection (lower
commutativity, i.e. correct implementation of τ2) has no chance if the imple-
menter has no knowledge of the τ0-constructor’s algorithmic compiling speciﬁ-
cation C0 of abstract HL- to abstract HML-language features plus his repre-
sentations of abstract source and target data and states by concrete ones. Bare
knowledge of the natural compiling speciﬁcation CC0 [34] based only on HL’s
and HML’s semantics is not helping the inspector. BSI’s so called oﬃcial
admittance of τ0 must include a readable algorithmic compiling speciﬁcation
which the speciﬁer is obliged to care for a correctness proof. Otherswise in-
spection of τ2 is in vain.
We have an analogous requirement to verify compiler τ1. Whether veri-
ﬁcation is done by hand or by support of a mechanical prover the veriﬁer has
to know or to deﬁne an algorithmic compiling speciﬁcation
C1 : SL ⇀ TL
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and ﬁrstly to verify C1 (i.e. C1 correctly implements the implementation rela-
tion SemSL  SemTL, i. o. w. for all well-formed πs with
πs C1 πt
πt is also well-formed with
[[πs]]SL  [[πt]]TL )
3
and secondly to prove that τ1 implements C1 correctly :
C1  [[τ1]]HL





of an abstract well-formed πs
4 terminates with π′t then there is a






and π′t is an acceptable HL-output datum. If π
′
t is not an acceptable error
but a regular datum, then π′t is well-formed with
[[π′t]]TL′ = [[πt]]TL ).
Most often a compiler constructor’s algorithmic compiling speciﬁcation is
a calculus of inductive conditional term rewriting or algebraic formula trans-
formation rules which deﬁnes a source language SL to target language TL
compiling relation C1 (or C0, a multivalued function), see [16,43,25], [15].
In order to economize the construction of a correct initial compiler N.Wirth
recommended, already in the 1970s [75], to identify source and host language
SL = HL and target and host machine TM = HM , TL = HML and the
compiling speciﬁcations C1 = C0. So we understand the notion compiling spec-
iﬁcation to be deﬁnition of a (preferably algorithmic) C1 with its veriﬁcation
of




4 So elements of programming languages like SL or SL′ which are not well-formed (have
no semantics) are considered as inadmissible input data of translations like C1 or [[τ1]]HL.
These are thought to assign an unacceptable error in the output data domain to every
inadmissible input datum.
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SemSL  SemTL




The notion Compiler implementation naturally splits in construction of a com-
piler version τ1 written in high level language and of a version τ2 coded in low


















The notion of a correct compiler does not require that it is furnished with
a complete syntax and static semantics checker (in spite of its practical impor-
tance), the programmer is allowed to oﬀer only well-formed source programs
to the compiler. If we have a veriﬁed compiler of a superlanguage SL0 of SL
then we need not change the compiler code in order to get a proved correct
SL-compiler, we need only a (mental) alteration of the code’s semantics by
assigning a larger set of inadmissible source programs.
5 Realistic correct initial compiler implementation
Prime goal of this article is to ﬁgure out the level of mathematical reasoning
which the compiler implementer, as opposed to the compiling speciﬁer, deﬁned
at the end of chapter 4, is expected to master. Therefore we can assume that
the compiling speciﬁer has already properly done his work, all mathemati-
cal speciﬁcation veriﬁcation inclusive (speciﬁcation correctness assumption).
A clear operational and an equivalent denotational semantics of SL help a
lot to do rigorous speciﬁcation veriﬁcation. For better trustworthiness a me-
chanical theorem prover should be employed, e.g. Acl2, PVS, HOL or KIF
[57,7,58,31,32,63,15,12,11,69], as much as possible with proof documents in the
mathematician’s short style. The availability of a veriﬁed algebraic compiling
speciﬁcation C1 makes high and low level compiler implementation veriﬁca-
tion a purely syntactic-algebraic reasoning activity; the implementer needs no
longer look at semantical aspects of involved languages [34].
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Formal methods projects have developed correct reﬁnement or implemen-
tation rules for speciﬁcations and programs [45,23,2,64], [42,70,1,14]. But we
rarely see complete well documented derivations of realistic compiler programs
written down in binary real life host processor code and correctly executable
by this processor or one of its family.
5.1 Realistic correct high level initial compiler implementation
The compiler writing and source language SL should be in close neighbour-
hood to the chosen speciﬁcation language. The latter is determined by the
mechanical theorem prover in case such a prover is employed. Especially,
SL should have good programming facilities which allow to write down SL-
program pieces which at execution time manipulate source and target program
terms as internal and external data of SL. Ideally, abstract program terms
of the speciﬁcation language should be internal data of the source language
as well. The SL-facilities should allow immediate evidence to the reader that
only such program terms are resulting which the speciﬁcation’s conditional
term rewriting rules permit [27,14]. In a way, [57,58] uses SL itself as the
speciﬁcation language, namely Boyer-Moore- or Acl2-Lisp. Consequence: If a
computation of the well-formed SL-written compiler program τ1 starts with a
well-formed source program πs and ﬁnishes with a regular result then this is
a well-formed target program πt which can be generated by the speciﬁcation
calculus as well; i.e. τ1 is correctly implemented.
We demonstrate construction of a piece of compiler τ1 due to an associ-
ated C1-rule from project Veriﬁx where SL has been deﬁned to be ComLisp
[24], a sublanguage of ANSI-Common Lisp [71], for several good reasons. A
ComLisp-program is essentially a list of non-nested function declarations with
call by value (strict) parameter transmissions. ComLisp has just one data
type: s(symbolic)-expressions which are abstract binary trees with a standard
character string representation. Abstract resp. concrete ComLisp-programs
are special abstract resp. concrete s-expressions.
ComLisp performs dynamic typing which a compiler can handle more eas-
ily than static typing and type inference as in Standard ML [54] . This fact
has excluded a sublanguage of ML as a candidate for SL. Especially, every
undeﬁned application of a ComLisp-operator leads to signalling of an accept-
able error at every implementation level. This enables the desired preservation
of partial program correctness.
Also C [46] is no candidate as a superlanguage of SL. C is not only too low
level (and nevertheless very distant from binary processor code), C’s semantics
of arithmetical operators depends on the arithmetic of those processors on
which translated C-programs are executed. This hinders reliable portability
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of and reasoning about C-programs.
C1’s term rewriting rule for ComLisp’s standard operator and user deﬁned
function calls is [25,15]:




Local and global variable environments ρ and γ and addresses k relative to
stack frames are parameters of calculus operators.
The compiler implementer implements this rule as a part of a function
declaration in τ1 [27]:
(defun CLform (form lenv genv k)
(cond
((consp form)





;; treatment of form as
;; ComLisp-keyword applications
...
(T ;; treatment of form as a standard operator
;; or user defined function application
(append
(CLforms args lenv genv k)
(list (list key k)))))))
...
;; treatment of form as
;; literals or variables
...
))
5.2 Realistic correct low level initial compiler implementation
Two problems arise:
H. Langmaack / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 141 (2005) 5–3218
(i) Where or how do we get hold of an executable compiler τ0 which corre-
sponds to BSI’s so called oﬃcially admitted compiler, i.e. which with a
very high probability for just one computation (one compiling) from input
τ1 to output τ2 adheres perfectly to the rules of compiling speciﬁcation
C1 = C0 ?
(ii) How can we arrange an industrially feasible code inspection of τ2 ?
Ad 1.: We should deﬁne SL as a syntactical and semantical sublanguage
of an industrially used superlanguage SL0 which is implemented by an ex-
ecutable, industrial strenght compiler τ00 on a real life processor M0, e.g.
Intel-Pentium.
|SL τ1 TL | |SL τ2 TL|
5
|SL τ1 TL| SL |SL τ0 TL| TL|
|SL |SL0 τ00 ML0|ML0|
|ML0|
Due to our understanding of the notion “compiler” τ00 is an SL-compiler
as well. Since SL-program τ1 is well-formed execution of τ00 will, in case
of successful termination, end up with a result τ0 which is, most probably,
a correctly executable implementation of τ1. Execution of τ0 will, in case
of successful termination, end up with a result τ2 which is, most probably,
also a correctly executable implementation of τ1. As soon as we have done
rigorous code inspection of the program pair (τ1, τ2) with respect to the veriﬁed
compiling speciﬁcation rules C1 = C0 we are deﬁnitely sure that τ2 is correct as
well. Should by accident τ00 not have worked correctly and intruded an error
in τ2 rigorous code inspection of (τ1, τ2) uncovers the error, see discussion
about Trojan horses later. Code inspection of (τ1, τ0) is not feasible if there is
no algorithmic compiling speciﬁcation C00 known for τ00.
Ad 2.: Even syntactic algebraic checking might become unmanageable if
the rules are too expansive and intertwined and the source/target documents
are very long. Next section 5.3 oﬀers a realistic method.
5.3 Multi pass compiling, good-natured compiling speciﬁcation rules and di-
agonal checking method
Three modes of acting are central for realistic, practical manageability of
syntactic-algebraic code inspection and so for low level compiler implemen-
tation veriﬁcation:
5 We use McKeeman’s T-diagrams as a shorthand for situations which should be more
precisely depicted by commutative diagrams.
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(i) Multi pass compiling: In order to bring up rules which cause only
modest expansions we split translation C1 from SL = ComLisp to ML =












Project Veriﬁx has chosen the Transputer T400 with 1 MByte of main
memory as target and host processor M . 6 This choice was due to
good experience in project ProCoS, T400 was available as a stand alone
processor.
(a) SIL is a stack intermediate language with s-expressions as data, oper-
ational stack semantics and variable names replaced by small relative
addresses. The underlying stack machine (also for the following Cint)
has similarities to N.Wirth’s P(Pascal)-machine [74].
(b) Cint is C-like, similar to Java’s virtual machine language JVL and
to IL in [62] ([67] uses C itself as intermediate language), with two
potentially inﬁnite linear integer arrays for stack and heap.
(c) TASM is assembly language, here oriented towards Transputer, with-
out symbolic addresses and with subroutines enumerated sequentially
and called via sequence indices.
(d) TC1 is external Transputer language in binary or hexadecimal no-
tation of bytes (resp. words) of subroutines and of initial stack and
heap. A small, 253 bytes long boot program is a representative of CT
and loads a well-formed TC1-program as a well-formed TC0-program.
The latter simulates the former in a 1:1 manner if the former is com-
piled from a well-formed ComLisp program.
ComLisp, SIL and Cint are machine independent. All intermediate lan-
guages have s-expression syntaxes as ComLisp has. It is worth mentioning
that realistic practice (where rigorous veriﬁcation is no primary aim) does
compiling with similar intermediate languages for manageability reasons.
(ii) Good-natured compiling speciﬁcation rules: We consider transla-
tion rules as subcases of inductive deﬁnitions of possibly multivalued, par-
tially deﬁned functions on s-expressions. A most important characteristic
of good-natured rules is: Juxtaposition of source and result s-expresssions
allows the reader to recognize every derivation (rewriting) step and every
associated location of rule application [43]. Even the very popular arith-
metic violates this characteristic. Look at the rules of natural numbers
6 Code generators for i386, DECα, MC68000, C and Forth are available as well, but so far
they depend on unveriﬁed software like assemblers or auxiliary compilers and lack veriﬁca-
tion.
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addition and multiplication:
A[[(o n)]] = n
A[[((+ 1 n) m)]] = (+ 1 A[[(n m)]])
M[[(o n)]] = o
M[[((+ 1 n) m)]] = A[[(m M[[(n m)]])]]
Pure addition A is good-natured, but multiplication M is not. E.g. in
order to check result N of M[[(N M)]] the checker in general has to do a
whole new derivation and see whether its result is really equal to N [16].
Such a phenomenon makes manual result checking unfeasible.
On the other hand, W. Goerigk and U. Hoﬀmann [43,25,26] found out
that all translation rules for C1, CL, CS, CC, CA
allow result checking without repeated derivations of result s-expressions.
The authors ﬁgured out the following good-naturedness properties:
(a) No left or right hand nestings of calculus operator applications like
CLform[[· · · ]]··· in section 5.1.
(b) Compositionality, i.e. left hand is a calculus operator application,
there are no multiple left hand variable occurrences, and right hand
variables occur also on the left hand.
(c) No multiple right hand variable occurrences.
(d) Order of left hand variables occurrences is preserved on the right
hand. Variable p and its disorder is not relevant because p stands for
ComLisp-operators and -function names only and they are atomic (!)
s-expressions.
These properties (a) to (d) have to take in consideration a possible con-
dition which an application of an s-expression rewriting rule is subjected.
Only those variables for s-expressions are relevant for feasible checkabil-
ity which stand for possibly non-atomic (!) s-expressions. It is a massive
help that all languages mentioned above have a subroutine concept and
subroutines are translated to subroutines.
The second multiplication rule above violates (a),(c) and (d). Opti-
mizing compilations make use of rules which do not satisfy the properties
of good-naturedness. So constructors of initial compilers should abstain
from optimizations and wait for later bootstrappings when low level com-
piler implementation veriﬁcation is no longer necessary.
The compiling speciﬁcation rules for all passes can be read in [25],
[15], the rules’ implementations in SL = ComLisp in [27], [14] and their
principal handling during code inspection in [43], [26,34].
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(iii) Diagonal checking method: To abstain from one pass compilation
and to split C1 in passes (see 1.) does not only lead to less expanding
compiling speciﬁcation rules. There is a further big advantage when
the passes are reﬁned down to TC1-code and checked (horizontal and
vertical transitivity of implementation correctness): All checkings below
the diagonal in the rectangular implementation diagram (see below) are
redundant as a matter of fact. E.g. let pass CA be implemented and
checked down to TC1, reading and printing routines included, and let
pass CC be done so only down to TASM. Then we can generate a correct
TC1-implementation τ53 of CC by bootstrapping on the Transputer due to
the hardware correctness assumption, chapter 1, 2.. Etc. τ52 for CS and
τ51 for CL. Most interesting: There is a very close connection between
this checking redundancy and N.Wirth’s strong bootstrap test [48,49].
Furtheron: The printing routines can be improved [52] so that it is
factually suﬃcing to implement the reading routines correctly in high
level ComLisp 7 (and not down in binary TC1) and to use the printing
routines as correctly implemented result checkers. The remaining manual
work is just to check given and printed s-expressions for equality.
In order to get a glimpse of feasibility of Veriﬁx’s syntactic-algebraic check-
ing method we show in Fig. 1 a complete code inspection documentation for
a short ComLisp-function declaration example f(x y) [34]:
Although checking is purely syntactical and the inspector needs no semantical
insight, in principle, a few semantical remarks might help to understand the
translations. The ComLisp-function body has two operator calls whose rewrit-
ing rule we have considered in section 5.1. 0, 1, 2, 3 are local addresses in
SIL (frame length 4), they correspond to 0, 2, 4, 6 in Cint , TASM and
TC1 (frame length 8). 51 = 33hex , 30 = 1ehex, 28 = 1chex are jump ta-




( COPYC 6 1)
(+ 0))
would be a semantically correct compilation result of function declaration f(x
y) also, but is not as speciﬁed in CL and so would be rejected by Veriﬁx’s
syntactical inspection.
7 A reading routine is just a ComLisp-implementation of lexical-contextfree analysis and
transduction algorithms proved correct in formal language theory.








(defun f(x y) (DEFUN F (DEFUN F (8)
(+
(*
x ( COPY 0 2) ( SETL ( L 0) 4)
( SETL ( L 1) 5)
y ( COPY 1 3) ( SETL ( L 2) 6)
( SETL ( L 3) 7)
) (* 2) (* 4)
6 ( COPYC 6 3) ( SETL 3 6)
( SETL 6 7)
) (+ 2) (+ 4)
) ( COPY 2 0)) ( SETL ( L 4) 0)




( DEFCODE F 51 (33 z 4a
ENTCD 8 (75 e0 73 75 e1 73 fa d3
75 52 d5 75 74 f9 a2 21
f0 73 58
71 f9 a2 21 f0 )
LDL 3 LDNL 0 LDL 3 STNL 4 73 30 73 e4
LDL 3 LDNL 1 LDL 3 STNL 5 73 31 73 e5
LDL 3 LDNL 2 LDL 3 STNL 6 73 32 73 e6
LDL 3 LDNL 3 LDL 3 STNL 7 73 33 73 e7
LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 30 GCALL 44 70 21 3e f6
LDC 3 LDL 3 STNL 6 43 73 e6
LDC 6 LDL 3 STNL 7 46 73 e7
LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 28 GCALL 44 70 21 3c f6
LDL 3 LDNL 4 LDL 3 STNL 0 73 34 73 e0
LDL 3 LDNL 5 LDL 3 STNL 1 73 35 73 e1
EXTCD ) (75 60 5e d5 75
31 d3 75 30 f6 ))
Fig. 1. A Code Inspection Documentation
Beside several simple typewriting errors the mechanical prover PVS [15]
has found one essential error which occurs at four places in [27]’s proposed
algorithmical compiling speciﬁcation. One occurrence is in the entry code
ENTCD of operator and function bodies in TC1, namely the Transputer in-
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structions 73 58 (LDL 3 LDNLP8) in our example. LDNLP (load non-local
pointer) does implicit index calculations without integer arithmetic overﬂow
checks. Integer arithmetic modulo 232 is done at several places, most of them
are correctly designed, four of them might lead to tangible failures at execu-
tion time. [15]’s correction is 44 48 25 f3 73 20 f5 (LDC 4 LDC8 MUL LDL
3 ADD). MUL and ADD do overﬂow checking.
The rectangular implementation diagram mentioned above in 3. is:
SemSL  SemSIL  SemCint  SemTASM  SemTC1

































































The diagonal is indicated by boldface mapping symbols like idext and
[[τ21]]SL
⇀
and language denotations like SIL′ . The compiling speciﬁcations are proved
correct (diagram commutativities of the ﬁrst row) in [15] and the high level
compiler implementations (second row) in [27,14]. The complete code inspec-
tion protocol (a mathematical proof documentation for low level compiler im-
plementation) is in [28,43], only the upper triangle is necessary. τ31, τ41, τ42, τ51,
τ52, τ53 need not be inspected, we are especially freed from most lowest level
code inspections. Every occurrence of a primed language L′ is input (resp.
output) data domain D of a host programming language HL. The regular
data Dreg are (sequences of) character strings which are either representa-
tions of well-formed L-programs or representations of other (sequences of) s-
expressions or further (sequences of) character strings. idext is the L-respective
extended identity mapping
idext = id ∪ Dreg ×A ∈ D ⇀ D ,
which expresses the compiler user’s readiness to accept every acceptable er-
ror report beside a regular (successfull) compilation result. The developed
ComLisp-compilers τ1 and τ2 preserve partial program correctness if we re-
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strict the compilation input data domains to well-formed source programs;
the sequential composition of τ11 to τ14 is the compiler τ1, the sequential com-
position τ51 to τ54 is the ﬁnally desired correctly executable compiler τ2.
There is a trend for systems software to be required open source, en-
abling source code scrutiny for operating systems components, compilers and
other tools and utilities. This will unveal a lot of bugs, but the open source
idea depends crucially on trusted compilation. Therefore the authors of [72],
[30,33,29] demonstrate how a hacker can corrupt the executable compiler τ00
in section 5.2 so intelligently that the generated compiler τ 2 passes Wirth’s
strong bootstrap test successfully and is nevertheless an incorrect implemen-
tation of the veriﬁed (!) τ1, i. e. τ 2 has got a Trojan horse from τ00. τ 2
translates just two SL-programs incorrectly, one application program π1 and
the compiler τ1.
BSI’s oﬃcial compiler test suites applied to τ 2 have no real chance to ﬁnd
the hacker’s specially chosen π1 with its translated π2 which reveals catas-
trophic results deviating from those of π1 . BSI has a trivial chance to ﬁnd τ1,
but BSI does no rigorous check of correctness of the translation result, which
is τ 2 due to the successfully passed bootstrap test. Here is BSI’s mental gap in
BSI’s prescription and recipe which forces compiler users to do low level code
inspection again and again. The neglected rigorous low level code inspection
of (τ1, τ 2) would have revealed that there is an error. The revelation comes
up even in the upper implementation diagram triangle due to the successful
bootstrap test.
Translation validation projects as in [67] or in [62] or also in Veriﬁx [37,36,21]
have a lot in common with Veriﬁx’s initial compiler subproject. The inter-
esting aspect is that the deviations in compiler research directions are not
conﬂicting but complementary.
Every translation validator’s program checker for an existing compiler pass
is to be veriﬁed and correctly programmed in a language, preferably the same
high level host language (C is high level in this respect) of the compiler pass.
So we get from one original problem to create a correctly executable compiler
pass to a new problem to ﬁnd a correctly executable compiler (pass) for a
new language, the host language. This is a circular hen-egg problem which
Veriﬁx’s initial compiler is interrupting by doing (some, as few as possible)
manual program checkings or program inspections [68,49].
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6 Conclusion
Can we answer the question in our article’s title? We think so, at least in
some respects. We have not looked at every possible today and future task of
a software implementer. But we have looked at a very diﬃcult and character-
istic problem where there is an intensive and duely investigated cooperation
between software speciﬁer and software implementer in mathematical mod-
eling, formalizing and rigorous proving: Realistic construction of a so called
initial correct compiler for a realistic high level programming (and compiler
writing) language correctly implemented on a real life host processor. Realis-
tic construction means: As much as possible avoidance of programming in and
inspection of lower level code. Unveriﬁed and unveriﬁed implemented auxil-
iary software, compilers and program checkers are allowed to be employed, but
their employments must be done so carefully that the correctness of the ﬁnally
implemented and executed initial compiler does not depend on any possible
incorrectnesses of auxiliary software.Any further high level language compilers
can be executably implemented by correct bootstrapping without any further
programming in and inspection of lower level code.
What kind and level of mathematical reasoning can computer science ex-
pect from the software, especially the compiler implementer?
(i) He must understand calculi of conditional program term rewriting rules,
which are just algebraic-syntactic formula transformation rules, and be
able to do derivations (algebraic transformations).
(ii) He must be able to develop program pieces in a compiler writing language
which at computation time result only in program terms which right hand
sides of rules permit. In a functional language of Lisp- or ML-kind such
developing is a very straight forward algebraic activity.
(iii) He must do rigorous syntactic a-posteriori code inspection of correspond-
ing source and target code pieces which a possibly not quite correct com-
piler has generated. This inspection is a purely algebraic derivation activ-
ity due to term rewriting rules which the compiling speciﬁer has proved
correct. So the implementer needs not care for any semantics issues. In
case the rules are good-natured as for the initial ComLisp to Transputer-
compiler all derivation steps are recognizable inside juxtaposed source
and target code. No extra derivation steps need be done.
Let us look at the software speciﬁer, especially the compiling speciﬁer. The
kind of mathematics he has to master is much deeper than performing al-
gebraic constructions, transformation and comparisons governed by algebraic
rewriting rules. The speciﬁer must be a versed expert in diﬀerent forms of
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denotational and operational semantics of programming languages and pro-
cessors. Correctness of compiling speciﬁcations requires very subtle rule and
measure induction proofs, an area of mathematical reasoning which many
software engineers are no friends of.
The time needed for proofs by help of a mechanical theorem prover is in
general not shorter than by hand. The prover can successfully prove decisive
theorems only if the user knows strategies how to do proofs by hand. The proof
eﬀort with PVS for all passes of the initial ComLisp to Transputer-compiling
speciﬁcation took about 36 person months including the development of widely
reusable veriﬁcation techniques, of course. If proof would not be mechanized
but just written down manually in a technical report, we believe that it is
unlikely that it would even be touched again, e.g. when changes in compiling
speciﬁcations, languages or target machine force for adjustments and reinves-
tigations [12].
Construction of the initial ComLisp to Transputer-compiler and imple-
mentation veriﬁcation including experimental work and design of source and
intermediate languages took about three years of intensive work, not counting
the mechanical proof. The low level syntactical a-posteriori code inspection
covers approx. 1000 pages of code inspection protocols (The initial compiler
consists of 237 ComLisp-functions, many are short and therefore many proto-
col pages are not totally ﬁlled up with text). A complete check takes less than
three person months of concentrated work, and additional trusted machine
support might further increase conﬁdence. The code inspection work load is
signiﬁcant, but well in the range of typical certiﬁcation eﬀorts [28,12].
Sometimes there are coming up critics that three months concentrated
work of an inspector might be too long and boaring so that errors may slip
through. But the software implementer who works here as an inspector should
not forget that his work is absolutely necessary mathematical proof work and
generated inspection protocols are proof documents which uncover every fail-
ure (also Trojan horses) which unveriﬁed auxiliary software (compilers) might
have intruded. Project Veriﬁx’s proceeding demonstrates that compiling spec-
iﬁcation veriﬁcation takes much longer concentrated proof work, liberates the
implementer from semantical issues and reduces the implementer’s mathemat-
ical reasoning to a moderate algebraic reasoning.
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